What it really is to perceive

Authors

  • Andrea Bucci Società Italiana di Neuroetica e Filosofia delle Neuroscienze

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23756/sp.v14i1.1743

Abstract

With this brief article I shall attempt to arrive at a definition of perception starting from the outlines of the metaphysics currently available to us on the topic. To this end, I argue that at the foundation of the various theorisations in the philosophy of perception there is a general agreement concerning the nature of the perceptual relation, but not concerning the nature of its relata—that is, the objects of perception. Once the transcendent nature of these relata has been established, the nature of the perceptual relation as a whole will become clear, and I will show en passant how theories surrounding the discovery of mirror neurons, if properly understood, provide a framework consistent with my discussion of perception and the related definitions.
Keywords: Philosophy of Perception; Perceptual Relation; Objects of Perception; Transcendence; Mirror Neurons.

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References

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Published

2026-06-30

Issue

Section

Volume 14 Issue 1 2026